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Landowners' Rights in Airspace - Crop Dusting
Liability For Trespass
Defendant was to spray nearby cotton fields, but, while flying super-
adjacent to plaintiff's land, unintentionally sprayed plaintiff's crops and
pastures. Plaintiff instituted suit for damages, his sole theory of recovery
being the alleged trespass of the defendant. The trial court awarded dam-
ages to plaintiff, and defendant appealed. Held: Where the pilot of an
airplane flying at a "privileged" altitude unintentionally sprayed poison
on the crops and pasture of land directly below the airplane, thus damaging
the crops and pasture, the landowner may recover damages solely on the
theory of trespass. Schronk v. Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) .'
The flight of aircraft above the earth necessarily involves the old, but
still unsettled, question of the landowner's rights in the airspace super-
adjacent to his land.! The conflict between the landowner and the aircraft
operator assumes numerous forms, and each area in this sea of conflict
involves particular legal consequences. Specific areas of conflict include:
1. simple overflights either above or below prescribed minimum altitude
levels; 3
I The plaintiff did not raise the question of negligence. His sole basis for recovery was trespass.
The appellate court's primary consideration was whether trespass would provide recovery absent
a showing of negligence and without the existence of a state statutory minimum altitude. The
main decision was followed by defendant-appellant's motion for rehearing which was denied.
a The law has evolved from Coke's ad coelum doctrine (he who owns the soil owns everything
above) to a general recognition that the landowner's rights in superadjacent airspace are re-
stricted. Authorities are in conflict as to how this restriction may be explained. Rhyne presents
five existing views in Airports and the Courts 1 55 (1944):
a. The landowner owns all the airspace above his property without limit (the ad
coelum doctrine).
b. The landowner owns the airspace above his property to an unlimited extent sub-
ject to an "easement" or "privilege" of flight in the public (Restatement view).
c. The landowner owns the airspace above his property up to such a height as fixed
by statute.
d. The landowner owns the airspace up as far as it is possible for him to take effective
possession, but beyond the "possible effective possession zone" there is no ownership
of airspace.
e. The landowner owns only the airspace he actually occupies and can only object
to such uses of the airspace over his property as do actual damage.
Rhyne asserts that the fifth or "nuisance" theory should be the only reasonable basis for
decision, however he points out that the courts are in conflict as to which theory should pre-
vail. For a general discussion of the evolution and modification of the ad coelum doctrine, see
2 C.J.S. Aerial Navigation § 5 (1955); 8 Am. Jur. 2d Aviation § 4 (1963); Calkins, The Land-
owner and the Aircraft-1958, 25 J. Air L. & Com. 373 (1958).
3 Some courts have been reluctant to grant recovery when the case involves a mere overflight
even when such overflight is below minimum altitude requirements, particularly in the airport
cases. Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 921, 181 F. Supp. 658 (1958);
Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W.2d 476 (1950).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. flights which may or may not be conducted above minimum altitude
levels but which cause damage to the land;" and
3. repeated overflights at such levels as to cause harm to the landowner
by virtue of noise, dust, and property depreciation.'
A landowner may seek an injunction or may institute suit for damages,
basing recovery upon negligence," nuisance,' trespass,8 or strict liability,"
depending upon the particular fact situation. Each of the foregoing areas
of conflict has peculiar characteristics which can dictate the choice of a
form of recovery. For example, repeated overflights, as in the airport noise
cases, ordinarily give rise to suits based on nuisance. The crop spraying
incidents usually involve an act or omission upon which an action for
negligence is predicated. Air trespass, at present, is an amorphous concept
which may transcend several areas of conflict, but which is most useful in
single overflights with resulting tangible damage to the landowner's prop-
erty. Since Schronk involves the application of the law of trespass to the
particular area of conflict of simple overflight with resulting damage, it is
necessary to precede the analysis of Schronk by a terse commentary on
the present state of air trespass and its manifestations."0
Trespass as a form of recovery by a landowner against an aircraft opera-
tor is saddled with the requisites of nuisance and clouded by the confusing
interpolation of minimum altitude requirements.1 It has been suggested
that air trespass should be abandoned altogether, since nuisance will ap-
parently suffice in those instances where air trespass might be applicable."'
Air trespass is practical as a form of recovery only when the landowner
can show actual damage to his land." That is, he will be entitled merely to
a nominal recovery unless he can show tangible effects of such trespass."4
" This is the most fruitful area for recovery by a landowner. Generally following United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the courts have favored the landowner through various
theories of recovery when actual damage can be shown. See Matson v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl.
225, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
' This was essentially the situation in the Causby case, supra note 4. The cases involving land-
owners in close proximity to airports are collected and discussed in Rhyne's book, Airports and
the Courts, supra note 2.
' Recovery through negligence is particularly prevalent in the crop-dusting cases. See Vrazel
v. Bieri, 294 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e. In jurisdictions which do not
apply strict liability, res ipsa loquitur may assist the plaintiff landowners. 8 Am. Jur. 2d § 123
(1963).
7Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87 (Ch. 1942). The Vanderslice case
required all the elements of nuisance before granting recovery in trespass.
8Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
'Strict liability has been imposed in those jurisdictions which still regard aviation as ultra-
hazardous. At present, nine jurisdictions (Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming) have strict liability provisions. See
Tentative Redraft No. 10, Restatement (Second), Torts § 520(a) (1964) for commentary calling
for abandonment of this viewpoint.
OFor a thorough coverage of the major aspects of air trespass see Anderson, Some Aspects of
Airspace Trespass, 27 J. Air L. & Com. 341 (1960). See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d § 4 (1963).
" See Vanderslice v. Shawn, supra note 7; Prosser, Torts, § 13, (3d ed. 1964); Anderson,
supra note 10, at 355.
"aAtkinson v. Benard, Inc., 223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960). Tentative Redraft No. 2,
Restatement (Second), Torts § 194 (1958).
13 Supra note 10.
14 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, supra note 8, at 758-59.
Any use of such air or space by others (superadjacent airspace) which is injurious
to his land, or which constitutes an actual interference with his possession or his
beneficial use thereof, would be a trespass for which he would have remedy . . . [as]
the case differs from the usual case of enjoining a trespass. Ordinarily if a trespass
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In addition, the federal government has enacted certain minimum alti-
tude requirements which must be considered when dealing with a potential
air trespass." These altitude requirements have had some effect upon those
cases involving low-flying aircraft, but even here some courts have ap-
plied the test of damages before allowing more than nominal recovery.
The crop spraying cases provide little nourishment for the growth of
air trespass, due to the fact that negligence or strict liability usually is
available and with more familiar legal ramifications. 7 Many of the crop
spraying cases involve wind drift or obviously negligent conduct, or both,
and thus preclude the application of trespass as an expedient and practical
form of recovery. It is only when negligence is not so apparent and strict
liability is not available that the use of trespass as a theory of recovery
becomes practical and perhaps even necessary.
Schronk is somewhat unique in that it provides a highly desirable factual
situation for the application of trespass. The combination of the direct
overflight and the resulting damage is certainly the basis of plaintiff's case,
and it is especially significant that the plaintiff was able to show that the
aircraft passed directly over his land. It is difficult to determine the exact
foundation for the court's decision. The opinion deals extensively with the
Restatement of Torts as it existed before the decision in United States v.
Causby" and as it is presently developing." The court acknowledged that
the defendant's mere entry into the atmosphere superadjacent to plaintiff's
land in itself did not constitute trespass, and the court even went so far
as to say that it made no difference whether the situation is "viewed as
wrongful act after a rightful entry or as a trespass ab initio."" The re-
sulting damage seemed to be the key factor which allowed the court to
position this case within the Restatement's definition of a non-privileged
flight." The court concluded the opinion by saying:
The entry of the fuselage, at even a privileged altitude, was accompa-
nied by active and continuous spraying of the poisonous substance which
constituted as much a part of the flight as if appellant's aircraft had been
dragging a great scythe across the land below it."
is committed upon land, the plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages without
proving or alleging any actual damage. In the instant case, traversing the airspace
above appellant's land is not, of itself, a trespass at all, but is a lawful act unless
it is done under circumstances which will cause injury to appellant's possession.
1572 Stat. 739 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1964).
16Anderson, supra note 10.
17 Supra note 9.
1 Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957); Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor
215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949).
1328 U.S. 256 (1946).
56Comment e, under § 159 of the Restatement, Torts (1934) stated that "an unprivileged
intrusion in the space above the surface of the earth, at whatever height above the surface, is a
trespass." Section 194 of the Restatement (1934) presented criteria upon which a trespass may
be founded: "Therefore, a flight at an otherwise permissible height above the surface conducted
in such a manner as to be dangerous to the land, or to persons or things thereon is not privileged."
After the Causby decision, Tentative Draft No. 9 of subdivision 2 of § 159, Restatement, Torts
(1946) read: "Flight by aircraft in the airspace above the land of another is a trespass, if, but
only if, (a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it
interferes unreasonably with the other's use and enjoyment of his land."
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Appellant argued in the motion for rehearing that a judgment based
on trespass is not authorized in the absence of a finding that he entered
the superadjacent airspace either wilfully or intentionally. Appellant's con-
tention forced the court to consider the question as to whether there may
be an actionable trespass where there is an unintentional and non-negligent
entry under the Restatement view.' The court attempted to show that
appellant's initial intention was not controlling by equating the present case
with Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Const. Co.,25 which involved
the unintentional severing of an underground telephone cable. Vowell held
that, "the trespass of the common law forms of action based on wilfull
and deliberate acts or negligence was not the 'trespass' involved ...the
important thing is that a property right was violated. 28 The court felt
that there was a controlling similarity in the facts of Schronk to the facts
in Vowell: "In neither case did the defendant wilfully, deliberately or
intentionally invade a property right in the exclusive dominion and pos-
session of the plaintiff. In neither case did the defendant actually intend
to inflict the damage., 27 The motion for rehearing produced some con-
fusion when the court chose to emphasize the disturbances within the
existing and redraft versions of the Restatement. 28 The court also stated
that Texas had not yet adopted the original Restatement. This apparent
backtracking causes one to have misgivings about the logic and soundness
of the main opinion.
The result of Schronlk is that a landowner who can show that the crop-
spraying aircraft passed over his land with resulting damage to his land
may recover in trespass. The adjacent landowner whose land was damaged
by drifting spray, as a practical matter, still should rely upon negligence
or strict liability if he is unable to show that the aircraft passed over his
land, or if in fact the aircraft did not pass over his land.
It is unfortunate that the court in Schronk failed to produce a lucid,
well-developed basis for its opinion. Certainly the result of the case is
correct, when one considers the recent trend in this area. The value of
Schronk lies not in its contribution to the sound development of air tres-
pass law but as a starting point for the future use of trespass as a basis for
recovery by landowners, particularly in similar crop dusting cases. The
holding in Schronk may provide some ammunition for a two-pronged
negligence/trespass attack, or when negligence is not easily shown, may
provide the sole basis for recovery.
James T. Lloyd
24 The court interpreted appellant's contention as relating to an intention to make the entry,
not as an intention to cause damage.
25 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148 (1960).
2Id. at 150.
17 380 S.W.2d 743, 746.
28 Ibid,
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Sovereign Immunity -Federal Tort Claims Act -
Discretionary Exemption Clause
While flying in its prescribed air lane, a regularly scheduled commercial
airliner, operated by United Air Lines, collided with a United States Air
Force Super Sabre Jet. The Super Sabre, descending from an instrument
training mission high above the commercial air lane, was proceeding accord-
ing to a flight plan prescribed by the Nellis Air Force Base Command.
The plan was conceived and executed without regard to commercial air
traffic in the training flight area, and was therefore in conflict with Air
Force regulations.' The accident resulted in the death of all passengers and
crew members of both aircraft. Inevitably, numerous wrongful death suits
were brought against the Government. The Government contended that
the flight of the Super Sabre was a product of discretionary planning by
NeUis Command. The Government also contended that it owed no duty
to the passengers and crew of the commercial flight, and thus there was
no negligent act on the part of the Government. Held: Selection of train-
ing flight areas by an Air Force base commander operating under policy-
making Air Force regulations is an exercise of discretion at the operational
level, rather than discretion exercised at the planning level, and is, there-
fore, not excepted by the Discretionary Exemption Clause' from the juris-
diction afforded the courts by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Further, a
commander permitting his aircraft to cross a crowded commercial air lane
with no inquiry as to the presence of commercial traffic is negligent in
sending military aircraft into that air lane.4 United Air Lines, Inc. v.
'Air Force Regulation 55-19, 13 July 1956, controls selection of local flight training areas.
It is reprinted in full as an appendix to the opinion in the instant case at 335 F.2d 379, 410.
The portions pertinent to this note are infra at note 32.
228 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964): Exceptions
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-.
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
328 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2678, 2680 (1964). Section 1346(b) provides that the federal
district courts are to have, subject to the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
Section 2674 provides that, "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances .. "
"The subject matter of this note is but one of the many areas under consideration by the
court. This case is the culmination of twenty-two cases to which the Government was a party.
The Government was not a party in nine additional cases arising out of the same accident. The
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Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).'
The curious "split-level" construction of the Discretionary Exemption
Clause is the product of two well-known Supreme Court cases, Dalehite v.
United States' and Indian Towing Co. v. United States.7 The Court in
Dalehite created the distinction of governmental discretion, splitting plan-
ning discretion from operational discretion, and stated that only planning
discretion exempted the Government from action by injured plaintiffs s
However, the Court also stated that in addition to the exemption afforded
the Government by discretionary planning, the legislative history of the
Federal Tort Claims Act 9 revealed a congressional intent that the municipal
corporations defense of governmental function should still be available to
the Government." In Indian Towing, government lawyers, probably with
Dalehite in mind, presented a defense of governmental function, and were
rebuffed. The Court held that the proprietary versus governmental func-
tion argument was inapplicable in the defense of tort claims against the
federal government.1' The Court expressed a desire to avoid the quagmire
of municipal corporations law," wherein liability is determined by whether
the act which resulted in damage was proprietary or governmental." Indian
litigation has been extensive and highly complex, involving choice of laws, workmen's compensation,
measure of damages, contribution and indemnification of joint tortfeasors, contributory negligence,
and procedure, as well as negligence and sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Wiener v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
709 (D. Nev. 1962); Rhoades v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Nollenberger
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
n The Government was appealing a limitation placed on contribution from United Air Lines.
United was appealing denial of indemnity over from the Government.
0 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
7350 U.S. 61 (1955). See also Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
8346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953). "Discretionary planning" is defined as a decision made where there
is room for policy judgment or decision.
9H.R. Rep. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 13 (1930); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 33, 28, 45, 65066 (1942); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942); H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1945); 86 Cong. Rec. 12021-12022
(1940). The Supreme Court's conclusions concerning the intent of Congress seem, at best,
nebulous.
10346 U.S. 15, 27-28 (1953):
The legislative history indicates that while Congress desired to waive the Govern-
ment's immunity from actions for injuries to persons and property occasioned by
the tortious conduct of its agents acting within their scope of business, it was not
contemplated that the Government should be subject to liability arising from acts
of a governmental nature or function.
'5350 U.S. 61, 65-67 (1955). For an excellent brief comparison of Dalehite and Indian
Towing, see generally Vaughn, The Discretionary-Function Exclusion of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 1 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 5 (1957).
'2 350 U.S. 61, 65-67 (1955). For an example of the confusion prevailing in one jurisdiction,
compare District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U.S. 450 (1890), in which sidewalk mainten-
ance was held proprietary, and resulting negligence therefore actionable, with Harris v. District
of Columbia, 256 U.S. 650 (1921), in which negligent street sprinkling was held governmental
and thus not actionable. For a case showing the basic irrationality of attempting to make the
distinction, see Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). For a philosophic view
debunking the basis of the distinction, see Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D.
Cal. 1948):
The defense that this [Federal Tort Claims] act does not apply to these cases
wherein the negligence occurred during the exercise of a sovereign power of the
United States, if heeded, would create a twilight zone of government activities in
which the consent given by this statute could not be applied. Too numerous are
the affairs of a purely governmental or sovereign nature, prohibited to or not
duplicated by the activities of private individuals to consider this to be the intent of
Congress. Certainly the statute itself makes no distinction. ...
"
5 Prosser, Torts § 125 (3d ed. 1964).
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Towing thus limited the jurisdictional defenses in relation to causes of
action sounding in tort against the federal government to those of the
Federal Tort Claims Act." Focus was thereby placed upon the doubtful
distinction of operational versus planning discretion rather than the equally
doubtful distinction of governmental or proprietary function.
After Indian Towing, a plaintiff had to face a new and different obstacle
when suing the Government in tort. The question became whether the
Government had committed a tort at an operational level or at a planning
level. The very fact that the Government can be wrong represents a great
advance in tort law. That "the King can do no wrong" was the law in
this kingless country for many years, and the familiar phrase is generally
regarded as the basis of governmental immunity. Such an idea is obviously
erroneous, for the King can do wrong, just as a private individual can do
wrong. Over the years, the phrase became altered slightly, and now reads
"the King can do wrong, but cannot be made to pay for the damage
unless he grants his permission."'" The tradition of governmental immu-
nity, inherited from our English forebears,'7 has been enduring a slow and
painful death at the hands of Congress. The first blow, the establishment
of the Court of Claims in 1855, ' created a tribunal which could find
against the Government in certain limited forms of action: those based
on contract, a federal statute creating liability, or the invasion of a prop-
erty right." The action of tort was specifically excluded in an expansion
of the court's jurisdiction by passage of the Tucker Act of 1887.' ° Despite
1428 U.S.C. S 2680(a) (1964), supra note 2. In addition to the discretionary exemption of
subsection (a), the statute provides that the following actions cannot be maintained against the
government:
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of
letters or postal matters.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of
Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government
in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quaran-
tine by the United States.
(g) Repealed, 64 Stat. 1043 (1950).
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by
the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces,
or the Coast Guard, during the time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal Land Bank, a federal inter-
mediary bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
15See generally, Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924), and
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 Yale L.J. 1 (1926).
16 See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
"' 1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 518 (2d ed. 1898).
" Though created in 1855, the court's power was limited to merely advisory opinions. In
1863 it was empowered to grant judgments.
19 Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Colum. L. Rev.
722, 723 (1947).
2024 Stat. 505 (1887).
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the passage of many private bills permitting the Government to be sued
in tort with its permission, and piecemeal legislation designed to relieve
especially painful grievances, 1 the average plaintiff was effectively barred
from suing the federal government. Thus, the passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 194622 was a great break with a long-standing tradition.
However, the break was not complete, for the Government was not about
to allow itself to be sued willy-nilly. Certain exceptions were created in
order to protect the Government against suits while engaged in certain
activities.' The most controversial of these exceptions is the previously
discussed Discretionary Exemption Clause," which has led to much litiga-
tion of which United Air Lines v. Wiener is a part."
Because the Court in Dalehite and its companion, Indian Towing, created
a cloud of doubt over jurisdictional defenses available to the Govern-
ment,20 additional defenses are always sought. In situations like the present
case, where a statute or regulation is in question, the Government raises
the defense of no duty owed the injured party because none was specifically
created by statute or regulation. The basic theory behind the "no duty"
defense is that in allowing itself to be sued when it could not previously be
sued, the Government did not intend that any new or novel forms of
action should be foisted upon it by virtue of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
27
This defense has met with some success. In Kirk v. United States" it was
found that the statute9 which authorized the governmental activity im-
posed no legal duty of care toward plaintiff. The court stated that no civil
liability is to be found even though the statute makes provision for the
general public as an entity, unless the statute specifically purports to
establish a civil liability.a" In Builders Corp. of America v. United States"'
plaintiff attempted to establish liability through a statute or regulation,
and again the court rejected the argument in the absence of an imposition
of specific liability. However, Wiener is different in that plaintiff was not
21 Actions were permitted in the case of patent infringement, 36 Stat. 851 (1918); admiralty
and maritime, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741, 742 (1964); injuries to oyster beds by
dredging, 57 Stat. 553 (1943).2228 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1964). It appears that the mounting number of
private bills finally brought passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act. See generally, Gellhorn and
Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United States, 55 Colum. L. Rev.
1 (1955). For an excellent "how to" article on maintaining a suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, see Haas, The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Private Lawyer, 1 Practical Lawyers'
Negligence Manual 23 (1964).
1328 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964), supra notes 2 and 14.
24 Ibid.
25 See note 4 supra.
26 Courts have struggled with close questions in distinguishing operational and planning exer-
cises of discretion. See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Dahlstrom v.
United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956); Union Trust Co. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 221
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.) aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 907, rev'd and remanded for decision on other
issues, 350 U.S. 962 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942 (1957); United States v. Lawter, 219
F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1955).
27See, e.g., National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 967 (1954).
28270 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1959).
2"68 Stat. 668 (1954), 33 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1964).
31270 F.2d 110, 117 (9th Cir. 1959): "The general rule is that a statute which does not
purport to establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare
of the public as an entity, is not subject to construction establishing a civil liability."
3"320 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964).
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relying on a statute or regulation. Rather, plaintiff relied upon the failure
of the Government to exercise ordinary and reasonable care. The court
thus discarded any supposition of duty created by statute, and returned
to the common law standard of ordinary care. The Discretionary Exemp-
tion Clause defense was defeated by more subtle judicial reasoning than
was the defense of no duty. The court in Wiener reasoned that policy-
level, or discretionary, planning had been accomplished by the authors of
Air Force regulations'2 which control in the realm of deciding where to
send aircraft on training missions. Thus, Nellis Command, operating under
those regulations, was only using its discretion at the operational level,
and jurisdiction properly attached.
The rationale of Wiener has been applied recently in Wenninger v.
United States." In Wenninger, plaintiff alleged a breach of Air Force
Regulation 5 5-19 and the court decided that jurisdiction attached despite
the Discretionary Exemption Clause.' Government counsel contended that
the decision made by the commander which resulted in the damage com-
plained of was planning discretion because the regulations 5 allowed the
commander the discretion of deciding when to employ them."6 Adhering
to the rule of Wiener, the court held that a decision based upon the "when
necessary" clause meant operational necessity. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit concluded that the highly complex process of pre-
scribing areas in which training flights are to take place is no more than
operational discretion because an Air Force regulation in substance states
that an Air Force commander should be careful when designating local
flying areas for training purposes. 7
An inspection and comparison of the cases indicates that other courts
have had problems distinguishing the "split-levels" of discretionary exer-
cise. For instance, it has been held that the completion of a general plan at
the detail level is an exercise of planning discretion." The decision of where
to place explosives in order to carry out a general plan is discretion exercised
at the planning level.3' However, the decision to fly aircraft at a low altitude
in order to carry out a general plan for the Civil Aeronautics Board is
32 Air Force Regulation 55-19, 13 July 1956:
2. Operational Control and Supervision. The commander having jurisdiction over
local flight operations will:
b. Schedule local VFR flight operations in a manner which will minimize potential
air collision hazards.
5. Control of Simulated Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) Approaches ...
a. The commander will direct maximum use of outlying facilities in order to
relieve traffic congestion near local navigational facilities.
33 234 F. Supp. 499 (D. Del. 1964).
34Id. at 503.
3 Section lb of AFR 55-19, 13 July 1956, states that the commander will issue notices of
heavy military air traffic when he deems it necessary, taking into account local air traffic con-
gestion.
3 See note 32 supra.
37 See note 3 5 supra.
s Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
'Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. TVA, 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950).
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operational.' Wiener, followed by Wenninger, places on the operational
level the decision of an air base commander of where to send his aircraft
on training missions. In the face of such conflict, government counsel have
exhibited some reluctance to go into court relying on the Discretionary
Exemption Clause, and have settled claims when a valid defense might
have been available."1 The essential result of the conflict and confusion
resulting from the decisions is a further erosion of governmental immunity.
The struggle of the courts in deciding what is discretionary and what is
operational has not yet resulted in a clear definition of the limits of
immune government activity."2 Indeed, such a clear definition might be
beyond the power of the courts. At least, the ever-increasing body of case
law discussing the Discretionary Exemption Clause would indicate that the
answer is not yet in sight.
Larry B. Bach
'Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956).
41 See Note, 30 J. Air L. & Com. 281 (1964). The Government settled, on a twenty-four
per cent basis, claims and lawsuits arising out of a collision between two commercial airliners
while in a "holding pattern" over Staten Island. The collision was due primarily to error by
government traffic controllers. The situation is similar to the one presented in the Union Trust
case, supra note 26. When testifying before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for the
1965 budget, former FAA Administrator Najeeb Halaby was questioned on why a settlement
was made costing the Government approximately $3 million. He said, "The Department of Justice,
after carefully looking over the case, said that the litigation risk of the judge . . . holding the gov-
ernment culpable indicated that we had better settle, so the judge got the parties together and
. . . worked out a formula." Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, H.R., 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 1155 (1964). If it had risked going into court, the
Government would have exposed itself to liability of approximately $12 million. It could have
argued that the controllers were exercising planning discretion, but apparently felt that the risk
of having the activities tagged as operational was not worth a $9 million gamble on unsure law.
42 Another series of decisions as an additional example concern psychiatric treatment rendered
by military hospitals: (the decision not to examine a patient is not actionable) Blitz v. Boog,
328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1964); (withdrawing a guard watching over a psychiatric patient is
actionable) United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952); (decision to release a patient
is not actionable) Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956). In Fair, the court
refused to say more than that each case must stand on its own facts, and was unable to determine
an applicable rule of law. In all of the above cases, plaintiff was injured by error of judgment
by an agent of the United States Government.
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Conflict of Laws - Lex Loci Delicti
Significant Contact Theory
George H. Hambrecht, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, purchased a round-
trip ticket to Phoenix from United Air Lines' in Philadelphia. On 11 July
1961, in the course of landing at Denver, Colorado, a scheduled stop, the
United DC-8 crashed, causing Mr. Hambrecht's immediate death. The ex-
ecutor of his estate brought an action in the Pennsylvania Court of Com-
mon Pleas in assumpsit against United Air Lines and some of its employees
for breach of contract of carriage, seeking recovery under the Pennsylvania
Survival Statute which allows the recovery of decedent's probable earnings
during the period of his life expectancy.' The Court of Common Pleas held
that the law of the place of the wrong controlled the issue of damages
and gave plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in order to conform to the
Colorado Survival Statute.' Plaintiff appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Held: Pennsylvania law, the law of the forum, controls the ques-
tion of damages.4 Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964).
The traditional choice of law rule in the torts field, previously followed
in Pennsylvania and firmly imbedded in the first Restatement, is the prin-
ciple of lex loci delicti' which dictates that the substantive rights and
liabilities of the parties are determined by the law of the place of the
wrong.' This rule has been closely allied with the vested rights theory,'
under which the rights and obligations incurred under the law of the
jurisdiction where the wrong occurs' are said to vest in the parties and
follow them into any jurisdiction in which suit is brought.! In order
'United Air Lines is a Delaware corporation which has its principal place of business in
Chicago, and is duly authorized to do business in Pennsylvania.
aPurdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950).
'The Colorado Survival Statute denies recovery for prospective earnings after death. Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 7, § 153-1-9.(1) (1963): "[A]nd in tort action based upon personal injury,
the damages recoverable ... shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or incurred
prior to death, and shall not include damages for pain, suffering or disfigurement, nor prospective
profits or earnings after date of death."
" In doing so, the court overruled the clear precedent of law for personal injuries which re-
quired the application of the law of the place of the wrong in determining whether a person
has sustained a legal injury. See, e.g., Vant v. Gish, 412 Pa. 359, 365-66, 194 A.2d 522, 526
(1963); Bednarowicz v. Vetrone, 400 Pa. 385, 162 A.2d 687 (1960); Rennekamp v. Blair, 375
Pa. 620, 101 A.2d 669 (1954); Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A.2d 313 (1952).
'Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 384 (1934): "(1) If a cause of action in tort is created
at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no cause of action
is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state."
6 Ibid.
'See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 377-92 (1935); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377-92
(1934); Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 8 (3d ed. 1963).
' Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934): "The place of wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."
. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes, J.): "The theory of
the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in
the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the
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for the vested rights theory to function, there must be a way to find a
forum which will apply the law of the place of the wrong." This is the
purpose that lex loci delicti serves, for it applies the law of the place of
the wrong to govern all the issues that arise."
Although lex loci delicti had been the law of long standing in Pennsyl-
vania," it has undergone recent deterioration elsewhere, because of the
inequitable results which are sometimes produced by its mechanical opera-
tions." Many courts have met the challenge that is sometimes presented
by the "wooden application of a few overly simple rules" '14 of lex loci
delicti" by classifying the substantive issues, including the damages issue,
before them as procedural and thereby subject to the law of the forum."8
One court stated that the survival of a cause of action was not an essential
part of the cause of action, but was a matter of enforcement of the claim
for damages, and thus a procedural question which falls under the law of
the forum. 7 Other courts have found exceptions to the law of the place
of the wrong by devising new law rules in tort actions involving ques-
tions of intrafamilial immunity from tort liability," workmen's compen-
sation," and decedent's estate law'" in order to apply their own law rather
than that of the place of the wrong. Still another court ignored the place
of the wrong rule and applied the state's statutory liability for the act
committed where the law of the place of the wrong would not have im-
posed a liability." In Auten v. Auten," the New York Court of Appeals
abandoned the traditional choice of law rules in contracts cases in favor
person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found." Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 377 (1934): "The place of the wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."
1o See Covers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 198 (1933).
11 See note 5 supra.
"See Barcly v. Thompson, 2 Pen. & W. 148 (Pa. 1830).
'aSee Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong"--Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 Wash. L.
Rev. 388 (1959). Professor Stumberg cites Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953), as an extreme example of this. In this case the plaintiff, her husband and the defendaist,
all residents of Texas, were making a flight from New Mexico to El Paso, Texas. The plane
overshot El Paso and made a forced landing deep in Northern Mexico. While attempting to take
off from the rough terrain, the plane crashed causing serious injuries to the plaintiff. Suit for
the injury was brought in a Texas district court where the plaintiff was denied recovery. Upon
appeal, the decision of the district court was upheld on the theory that since this was a Mexican
tort the law of Mexico controlled. However, the court refused to apply Mexican law because
the remedy given was so dissimilar from that afforded under the law of Texas.
'" Grifflth v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796, 801 (1964).
" The first Restatement recognized two exceptions to the rule: the forum applies its own
procedural rules, Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 585 (1934), and the forum applies its own
law when the law of the place of the wrong is contrary to a strong public policy of the forum,
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 612 (1934).
" See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 539, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133, 137 (1961) (damage limitation classified as procedural).
"Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 866, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (1953). In the alternative the
court reasoned that survival of tort action is a question of administration of the decedent's estate,
hence is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile.
1 In Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), a child was permitted to recover
from his parent under the law of the domicile. See generally Ehrenzweig, Parental Immunity in
Conflicts of Law, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 474 (1956).
"9See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
2o See note 17 supra.
"See Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (Dram Shop
Act applied to hold innkeeper liable for negligence occurring outside of forum).
2308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
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of a "center of gravity" or most significant contacts theory."3 Finally, in
Babcock v. Jackson,"' the same New York court applied the same theory
to an action in trespass. Judge Fuld concluded that "justice, fairness, and
the 'best practical result' . . . may best be achieved by giving controlling
effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or
contact with the occurrence or the parties has the greatest concern with
the specific issue raised in the litigation.""5 Although practically all of the
legal writers are opposed to the retention of the lex loci delicti rule, there
is disagreement as to the successor to this rule."
If the new "significant contact" theory is applied, the law of the place of
the wrong is applicable only if that state has sufficient significant contacts7
with the parties and events in the case to have an "interest" in the out-
come of the litigation. In the instant case, Colorado's only contact was
purely fortuitous. Although "the place of the injury may have an interest
in the compensation of those who render . . . assistance to the injured
party," no such interest arose from the rendering of medical aid since the
decedent had been killed instantly." Furthermore, the policy behind the
" This newly adopted theory conforms with the position advocated by the Restatement
(Second), Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) which states that torts should be
governed by the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties, and the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and the parties and that separate rules apply to different kinds of torts. See,
e.g., the discussion in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d at 802.
24 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident in Ontario, Canada, while riding as an invited week-end guest in the
automobile owned and operated by the defendant's deceased husband, a New York resident.
Plaintiff sued the driver, Mr. Jackson, in New York, where plaintiff also resided. After Mr.
Jackson's death, Mrs. Jackson, his executrix, was substituted as defendant. The trial court dis-
missed the case on the grounds that although New York has no guest statute, the Ontario statute,
Ont. Rev. Stat. Ch. 172, S 105 (2) (1960), applied and barred recovery. The Court of Appeals
reversed. It stated that although the accident took place in Ontario, all other contacts of the
parties were in New York. The court reasoned that:
Although the rightness or wrongness of Defendant's contact may depend upon
the law of the particular jurisdiction through which the automobile passes, the
rights and liabilities of the parties which stem from their guest-host relationship
should remain constant and not vary and shift as the automobile proceeds from place
to place. 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
21 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
"Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952); Currie,
Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L.J. 1; Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 754 (1963); Ehrensweig, The "Most Significant Relationship"
in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 700 (1963); Ehrensweig, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1963); Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflict of
Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 Yale L.J. 1155 (1947); Morris,
The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Re-
statement Second, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 679 (1963); Stumberg, supra note 13.
27 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964):
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationships with
the occurrence and with the parties determine their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of
most significant relationship include:
(a) The place where the injury occurred,
(b) The place where the conduct occurred,
(c) The domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and
(d) The place where the relationship, if any between the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider
the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevent purposes of the tort rules of
the interested states.
Comment, The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 762 (1963).
28203 A.2d at 807.
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Colorado Survival Statute appears to be a desire to prevent its state courts
from speculating on the compensation for damages, and to protect its
citizens from excessive damage judgments." Since neither of these local
policy concerns is present in the instant case, Colorado should not object
if Pennsylvania applies its own law.
Pennsylvania could point to significant contacts which gave it a sub-
stantial interest in the present case:
1. decedent was domiciled in Pennsylvania,
2. the airline ticket was purchased in Pennsylvania, and
3. his estate was administered there.
Furthermore, the surviving dependents were residents of Pennsylvania.'
It appears that the court was justified in applying the "significant contact"
approach to the litigation.
It is quite possible that the abolishment of the lex loci delicti rule will
create problems,"' and that the rule put forth by the court in Griffith may
not promote the desired consistency." However, these challenges were met
quite effectively by the Pennsylvania court when it said that "ease of
application and predictability are insufficient reasons to retain an unsound
rule," and "our standards will be no less clear than the concepts of 'un-
reasonableness' or 'due process' which courts have evoked over many
years." It is also contended that the abolishment of lex loci delicti will
lead to "forum shopping" in order to find the highest damages award.
This problem could exist because more than one state may have sufficient
significant contacts which will justify the application of its own law.'
On the other hand, the lex loci delicti rule totally ignores the policy con-
siderations of other states which may have significant contacts with the
events.
In deciding to apply the law of its jurisdiction, the highest court in
Pennsylvania did not attempt to side step the lex loci delicti rule as: other
courts have,"s but rather it chose to abolish the old rule in favor of the
significant contacts theory. The results of such a test seem to far outweigh
the effects of the old rule. Of course, the ideal rule is one that is uniform
and predictable and produces just results. Although the traditional choice
of law rule is uniform and predictable, it is often unjust. The test offered
in Griffith is designed to produce the just results, although at present, its
application will not always be uniform and predictable. However, as the
court aptly stated, "ease of application and predictability are insufficient
reasons to retain an unsound rule.""s  John R. Bauer
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
"' 203 A.2d at 809 (Dissent). See also Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing Attorney's
Reflections Upon the Opinion and Its Implications, 31 Ins. Counsel J. 428 (1964).
2 Ibid.
33 203 A.2d at 803.
'" Id. at 806; See also Cheatham, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in
Conflicts of Laws, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212, 1229 (1963).
ss See note 31 supra; But see Cravers, The Changing Choice-Of-Law Process and the Federal
Court, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 732 (1963).
' See notes 16-19 supra.
7 See note 13 supra.
s See note 34 supra.
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Corporate Law - Federal Aviation Act -
Is Corporate Control a Thing of Value?
In 1958, National Airlines and Pan American World Airways exchanged
large blocks of their stock using voting trustees as the method of exchange.1
Each airline assigned its stock to a voting trustee who would vote the stock
in accordance with the other airline's wishes. The apparent purpose of the
trustees was to avoid the appearance of a merger, although the real result
was equivalent to an exchange of stock directly between the corporations.
The Civil Aeronautics Board viewed the transaction as a merger and
ordered the arrangement dissolved.! The two companies were ordered to
either sell or re-exchange their mutual holdings.' The latter course was
chosen and National exchanged 353,000 shares of Pan American stock,
held by a voting trustee for the use of National which had a value of
12,906,400 dollars, for 390,000 shares of National stock held by a voting
trustee for the use of Pan American, valued at 11,115,000 dollars. Plaintiff
O'Neill, a shareholder of National, brought a derivative shareholder's
action on behalf of National against Mr. Lewis B. Maytag, Jr. and his
associate directors, complaining that National's directors had thus cost the
corporation approximately 1,791,400 dollars.! O'Neill brought his suit in
federal court, and in an attempt to avail himself of the theory of pend-
ent jurisdiction,' he claimed a breach of Section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Acte and Section 409 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act." Held:
The exchange of stock did not constitute a breach of section 10 and
Rule X-10B-5, and corporate control is not a thing of value under section
409(b); therefore, jurisdiction did not attach. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339
F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
As the basis for his first federal question allegation, O'Neill relied upon
'The use of the voting trustee in the airline industry has brought about much recent cor-
porate infighting and CAB decision-making, particularly in the Howard Hughes-Toolco-Trans
World Airlines dispute. See generally Comment, 31 J. Air L. & Com. 133 (1965).
2 Pan American-National Agreement Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 198, 241 (1960). "The . . .
stock agreement . . . which enables Pan American to control National, to restrict competition,
to create a monopoly and to jeopardize other air carriers . . . or the public, is found to be adverse
to the public interest....
I Id. at 207-08.
" Plaintiff alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. He further alleged that the directors of National
wasted corporate assets in order to secure a better control position for themselves by eliminating
a large block of outstanding voting stock. Such allegations state a cause of action under state
law. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b; Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 885 (1962).
. Pendent jurisdiction, wherein a federal court considers both federal and state causes of
action, depends upon a federal question arising out of circumstances which would lead to a state
cause of action. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246
(1933); Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957). Cf.
Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949).
648 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
'72 Stat. 768, 49 U.S.C. § 1379(b) (1964).
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Rule X-10B-5, s promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act,9 which deals with deceptive and manipulative devices. Although
the Supreme Court has not ruled upon the point, it is generally agreed
that Rule X-10B-5 gives rise to a civil remedy." The purpose of the
rule is prohibition of fraudulent practices in the securities market; it
makes such practices a violation of uniform federal law.1 Within the
scope of Rule X-10B-5, a fraudulent act can be express or implied, and
the presence of an outright lie is often immaterial." For example, the act
of minimizing dividends in order to influence stockholders to sell their
stock is fraudulent because lower dividends create the impression of a
poor earnings record, rendering the stock an undesirable investment item.
The creation of the false impression makes the act deceitful." However,
trading corporate assets at a disadvantage to the corporation, with no
fraudulent intent or fraud in fact, does not create a false impression and,
therefore, Rule X-10B-5 is inapplicable." It is not sufficient for an action
under Rule X-10B-5 to allege breach of general fiduciary duty if the
breach was not of a fraudulent nature." Mr. Maytag and the other direc-
tors may have caused National to suffer a loss in the re-exchange, but the
court could not find any set of facts which could be construed as fraudu-
lent in fact or intent. In the absence of federal grounds for relief under
Rule X-10B-5, the theory of pendent jurisdiction could not attach to the
plaintiff's allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff relied upon Section 409 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act" as
the basis for his second federal question allegation. Section 409 (b) was
'17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-s (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national security exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in the light of cir-
cumstances which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
948 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
50Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See the same case and
accompanying text in Baker & Cary, Corporations 566 (3d ed. 1959); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d
649 (1954). For a shareholder's derivative suit under the rule, see Slavin v. Germantown Fire
Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949).1
'Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
"In Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 191), the court held that
failure to disclose contemplated liquidation to shareholders is a deceitful act.
"Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
14 339 F.2d at 768.
15 Id. at 767.
72 Stat. 769, 49 U.S.C. S 1379(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any officer or director of any air carrier to receive for his
own benefit, directly or indirectly, any money or thing of value in respect of negotia-
tion, hypothecation, or any sale of any securities issued or to be issued by such
carrier, or to share in any of the proceeds thereof.
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originally enacted as Section 409 (b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938."' Part of the original purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which
unified the functions of various governmental agencies dealing with avia-
tion, 8 was the tighter regulation of securities transactions within the indus-
try. 9 Consequently, section 409 (b) prohibited the directors of carrier
corporations from receiving directly or indirectly, any money or thing of
value through any dealing in the shares of the carrier. Section 409 (b) was
re-enacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 with little comment,
0
and it has rarely been the subject of litigation," despite the loose usage of
so general a phrase as "thing of value."
In the instant case, plaintiff's attempt to bring his cause under a rela-
tively untried section required a first impression construction of the scope
of the phrase, "thing of value" within the purview of section 409 (b).
He alleged that an increase of control of a corporation was a "thing of
value" within the scope of 409 (b). The defendants' control of National
Airlines had certainly become more secure after the re-exchange of stock.
After the original assignment of stock to the voting trustees, it seemed
apparent that, pursuant to the terms of the initial stock exchange, opera-
tional control of National Airlines was being shifted to Pan American."
Pan American had the largest single block of National's voting stock.
Furthermore, the two companies had taken preliminary steps toward con-
solidation of such items as fuel storage, facilities, and operations. Pan
American had intended to use the block of stock to exercise substantial
control over the day-to-day business operations of National.' The ques-
tion presented to the court was whether the reacquisition of control by
National, as ordered by the CAB, represented something of value in the
hands of National's directors, and was therefore prohibited by 409 (b)."
17 52 Stat. 1003.
"9 The Bureau of Air Commerce, regulating safety; Post Office, exercising substantial economic
control through the letting of airmail contracts; Commerce Commission, fixing rates, and other
economic controls.
19H. R. Rep. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938):
It is the purpose of this legislation to co-ordinate in a single independent agency
all of the existing functions of the Federal Government with respect to civil aero-
nautics and, in addition, to authorize the new agency to perform certain new regula-
tory functions which are designed to stabilize the air transportation industry in the
United States.
See also, S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); Morris, The Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 28 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 35 (1960); 37 Mich. St. B.J. 17 (1958); Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev.
137 (1938).
"°Federal Aviation Act S 409(b), 72 Stat. 768, 49 U.S.C. § 1379(b) (1964). S. Rep. No.
1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958): "The present measure makes no substantive change what-
soever in the provisions governing air carrier regulations." It was specifically stated, however, that
this action did not represent legislative adoption of previous judicial decisions. H. R. Rep. No. 2360,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1958). See also 37 Mich. St. B.J. 17 (1958).
"'Lehman v. CAB, 209 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 916 (1954), held
that a partner of an underwriting firm issuing carrier stock, who was also a director of the carrier,
was realizing a profit from sale of the shares; National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197
F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952), discussed the purpose of both § 409(a) and 5 409(b) in controlling
interlocking directorates and pooling arrangements; in Bowman v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 14 F.R.D.
70, 74 (D. Alaska 1952), § 409(b) was mentioned only in a procedural problem, and was not
construed.
22Pan American-National Agreement Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 198, 201 (1960).
23 id. at 202.
2 Ibid.
25 339 F.2d at 769.
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For most purposes, the ability to control a corporation is considered a
thing of value." Broadly speaking, among closely held corporations ma-
jority stock is more valuable than minority stock. Depending upon local
statutes and the charter of the corporation, majority stock controls the
activities of the business, with the possible exception of certain corporate
decisions, 7 presuming the usual sort of voting requirements for corpo-
rate activities in the typical closely held corporation."8 In large public cor-
porations control is usually not dependent upon a simple majority of voting
stock, but is a more subtle question of voting blocks, proxy control, and
voting agreements. Therefore, although the stock sold or exchanged may
represent only twenty-one per cent of the voting stock outstanding, as
was the case in the initial National-Pan American agreement, a large
measure of the ability to control a corporation may be represented by a
"minority" block of stock. Considering the monumental struggles for
control of corporations evident in modern American business practice, 9
it would seem apparent that an acquisition of control of, or, at the mini-
mum, an increase in the ability to control, a large corporation would be a
thing of value; and, an increase of control realized through a "negotiation
•. of securities" would be in violation of section 409 (b) .' To hold other-
wise is contrary to the congressional intention that mergers and pooling
in the air carrier industry be closely controlled.2 '
The courts offered various reasons for holding that, on the facts of this
case, control was not a thing of value under section 409 (b). The trial
court was of the opinion that the phrase meant money or its equivalent-
some tangible, marketable thing of value.2 The appellate court reasoned
that even without the disparity of stock values, improved control position
would have inured to the directors of National without any breach of
duty, and that section 409 (b) should not be construed to mean that a
completely fair exchange which results in an improved control position is
illegal." Perhaps the real reason for the decision can be found in the
peculiar facts of the case. O'Neill was attacking as illegal a transfer of
stock which the CAB ordered as being in the public interest.'
In the instant case, the court defined and construed two different laws
"Royal Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 247 Fed. 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1917); Elliot v.
Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N.E. 450 (1907); Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (1941). See also Baker
& Cary, Corporations 590 (3d ed. 1959): "A purchaser is likely to be willing to pay more for
a block of shares giving control than not giving control. Control is therefore a thing of value in
the hand of the holder."
2 Very generally, most decisions are made by majority rule in corporations. However, questions
of great import, such as liquidation- or sale of corporate assets generally require adoption by a
much higher percentage of shareholder votes. See, e.g., Ill. Bus. Corp. Act $ 157.72 (c) (19 54,) (3
vote required for sale of corporate assets).
2s Excepting major questions, such as those mentioned in note 27, supra, majority rule controls.
However, charters may be written so that much greater than majority vote is needed, thus giving
minority shareholders considerable strength.
"Comment, 31 J. Air L. & Com.:133 (1965). See also McDonald, T.W.A.: The Struggle for
the Corporate Cockpit, Fortune, May 1965, p. 106.
30 See note 16 suftra.
a See note 2 supra.
82230 F. Supp. at 238.
92339 F.2d at 769.
" Pan American-National Agreement Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 198 (1960)-.
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in the realm of securities regulation. The decision that Rule X- 1 OB-5 was
aimed only at fraud, and not at breaches of fiduciary duty, is an affirmation
of majority rule." The construction of Section 409 (b) of the Federal
Aviation Act is not as clear. In holding that control was not a "¢thing of
value" within section 409 (b),' the court seemed to deny obvious cor-
porate truths. However, it appears that facts peculiar to the situation
where the plaintiff attacks a CAB order to exchange stock influenced the
court to say that control was not a thing of value and limited the initial
construction of the phrase to this framework. Certainly, if one could
allege corporate benefits received through increased control, such as salary
increase, executive benefits, or use of corporate facilities, the claim of
receipt of a "thing of value" would properly invoke section 409 (b) in
that control has been used by the offending director to obtain corporate
benefits. It appears that this initial construction of the phrase "thing of
value" is applicable only to the facts of the instant case and is not of
great value as authority for definition of the phrase.
Larry B. Bach
"
5 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
36 339 F.2d at 769.
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